We analyze empirically the system of allocation of rights and monetary incentives in a sample of automobile franchise contracts. We find that the contracts create an asymmetric assignment of decision rights: while they substantially restrict the decision rights of dealers, they grant manufacturers extensive implementation and enforcement powers, converting the manufacturers, de facto, in a sort of quasi-judiciary instance. We also find that the variation in the system of rights assignment and monetary incentives responds to efficiency considerations. In particular, when the cost of dealer moral hazard is higher and the risk of manufacturer opportunism is lower, manufacturers enjoy larger discretion in both determining the desired performance from the dealers in their network and in using mechanisms such as monitoring, termination and monetary incentives to ensure this performance is provided. We also explore the existence of interdependencies between the different elements of the system. We find that the evidence does not support the conclusion * We thank Oliver Williamson for his advice and support and Jürgen Backhaus, Judith Chevalier, Harold Demsetz, Antony Dnes, Alberto Fernández, Manuel González, Emilio Huerta, Peter Klein, Inés Macho, Cándido Paz-Ares, and numerous workshop participants for their comments and suggestions. This work has benefited from financial support by DGESIC through grant PB95-0989.
that important complementarities between these elements exist. After controlling for common sources of variation, most of the comovements between instruments becomes insignificant.
INTRODUCTION
This paper analyzes empirically the solutions provided by automobile franchising contracts to the moral hazard problems present in franchising relations. It goes further than the previous literature in that, rather than focusing only on the strictly "monetary" aspects of the contracts, or only on the assignment of a particular right, it analyzes the entire system of allocation of rights over substantive decisions and the monitoring, punishment and reward mechanisms. The paper finds that the degree of contractual asymmetry varies between the different networks in a manner consistent with the differential impact of moral hazard. Contracts allow more discretion to manufacturers when the potential cost of dealer moral hazard is higher and when the manufacturer's opportunism is better controlled by his reputation.
Most of the empirical literature on contract design has focused on the strictly "monetary" aspects of the contracts, whether dealing with compensation and incentives in firms (see Prendergast 1999 for a survey of this literature) or, in franchising, with royalty rates and franchise fees (e.g. Lafontaine, 1992; Sen, 1993; Lafontaine and Shaw, 1996) 1 . A small but growing body of literature has studied the use of other contractual terms. The pioneering study here is Masten and Crocker's (1985) analysis of the use of take or pay provisions for natural gas as an incentive mechanism. In a work more related to ours, Gompers and Lerner (1996) systematically study the use of covenants in venture partnership agreements, and explain the variation partly as a consequence of the difference in the incidence of opportunistic behavior. Kaplan and Stronberg (1999) are closest to our work in that they study the whole system of rights allocation in venture capital contracts. In the franchising context, Dnes (1993) , Mathewson and Winter (1994) and Brickley (1998) have studied the use of some specific clauses and the extent to which complementarities between them exist. However, neither in the general contractual design literature nor in the franchising one has any paper, to our knowledge, seek to explain the contribution of the whole system of monetary and non-monetary contract terms at the disposal of the parties to the solution of the incentive problems present in these relations and the interactions between the different elements of the system.
In analyzing the assignment of decision rights by these contracts, we take as out starting point the hypothesis that the rights assignment involves a trade-off between the risk of ex post opportunism on the two sides. More manufacturer discretion reduces the risk of moral hazard on the dealer side, while simultaneously intensifying the risk of manufacturer incentive and hold-up hazards. Thus we expect manufacturer discretion to increase with the importance of vertical and horizontal externalities and with the manufacturer reputational capital .
We make three main sets of findings. First, we find that all contracts substantially limit ex ante decision rights of franchisees, while granting extensive implementation, monitoring and enforcement powers to manufacturers. In particular, dealers must attain sales targets set by manufacturers, they must provide information and publicity as required by manufacturers, and they must use the quantity and quality of facilities, labor and machinery that manufacturers determine. Manufacturers also have a range of enforcement rights (monitoring, termination and use of monetary incentives) to ensure that these outcomes take place. We find substantial cross-brand variation on the contractual allocation of enforcement rights to manufacturers and some, but less important, variation in the allocation of decision rights to define ex post the content of the contractual obligations, what for brevity we will call here "completion rights". Moreover, we find no within brand variation in the contracts used. All dealers of the same network sign an identical contract, updated yearly.
Second, we find support for the hypothesis that the degree of contractual asymmetry varies between the different networks in a manner consistent with the differential impact of moral hazard. Contracts allow more discretion to manufacturers when the potential cost of dealer moral hazard is higher and when the manufacturer's opportunism is better controlled by his reputation. In particular, manufacturers of higher quality cars and those with larger networks have larger discretion over the operation of their networks, both in terms of the completion rights and in their ability to enforce and provide incentives to their dealers. This is consistent with the predictions of a theory relying on the cost of (dealers') moral hazard as the source of variation in the contracts. Moreover, older networks assign more completion and enforcement rights to manufacturers. This may reflect, as we suggest, the fact that longer horizons are related to higher manufacturer reputation (allowing contracts to be more asymmetric) but it may also simply reflect the importance of learning about contract design. Also, Asian manufacturers have a significantly lower level of centralization of rights in the manufacturer. This is consistent with recent finding in the empirical literature about the reliance of Asian manufacturers on non-verbal, trust based agreements (Sako and Helper, 1998; Holmstrom and Roberts, 1998) .
Third, all the rights and incentives move together in a manner consistent with the hypothesis that the source of variation in the data is the differential impact of moral hazard in the different networks. However, after controlling for common sources of variation, we find little evidence consistent with the existence of complementarities between the allocation of different sets of rights or the use of different monetary mechanisms. The exception is the existence of significant comovements between the allocation of monitoring rights and the strength of the sales related monetary incentives, consistently with the monitoring intensity principle; and between the allocation of completion and termination rights.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the case and the data.
The paper proceeds from here to center the analysis on the allocation of groups of rights, rather than focusing on individual ones. This is a consequence of our observation of the existence of very similar patterns of variation in manufacturer discretion in all of the rights, which we will confirm explicitly in Section 4. Section 3 proposes a theoretical framework to analyze the relationship. Section 4 presents the results and discusses them. Section 5 concludes.
THE ESSENTIALS OF THE CASE
This section describes the main characteristics of the decision rights assigned and monetary incentives used in our sample of automobile franchise contracts. Readers interested in a more complete description of the individual contractual clauses should refer to Arruñada and Vázquez (1999).
The Organization of Automobile Distribution in Spain
Dealerships provide two types of services: those associated with sales, which include physical distribution and the production of several types of information, and after-sale services, which cover the repair and maintenance of the cars.
Dealerships distribute automobiles for a particular manufacturer. No distributor in our data sells brands of multiple manufacturers. They also provide customers with large quantities of information on new cars, which requires investment in advertising as well as sales staff. Dealers maintain brochures, showrooms, trial cars and an ample stock of new cars to facilitate inspection and allow for test driving and quick delivery. Moreover, they provide complementary services by acting as insurance and finance brokers as well as dealing with the paperwork involved in car registration. A byproduct of these services is that dealers produce information on customer preferences, which is used by manufacturers to plan car manufacture.
Dealerships provide the specialized maintenance and repair services required by cars. To supply these services, dealerships maintain specialized technicians, machines and automobile spare parts.
The Data Set
The empirical analysis of the contracts is based on the dealership contracts of the 23 main networks operating in Spain (which represent 99.3% of the market and all of the important multinational firms). We complement the contractual data with data on the characteristics of the dealerships of the different networks, including particularly the number of dealerships, the age of the network, the price of the automobiles sold by the network and the average profitability of the dealerships in the network, as measured by the average return on sales. 
Contractual Assignment of Completion and Enforcement Rights
A first striking feature of the data is that the contracts present no variance between dealers of the same brands, as each year an updated contract is circulated to all members of 2 See the appendix for a more extensive data collection description and the descriptive statistics of these variables.
the network and signed. 3 Contracts do not respond within brands to the variation in dealer's characteristics, such as reputation.
All contracts assign certain limited rights to the dealers. This allocation, mostly made implicitly by not including limiting rights in the contract, defines a core set of dealers' rights common to all the networks. In particular, dealers set the financial conditions and prices of cars sold, always below the maximum prices established periodically by the manufacturers. They also decide on the quantity and model of automobiles they order from the manufacturers. Manufacturers can however force them to sell some models (quantity forcing), in exceptional circumstances. Finally dealers may choose, subject to manufacturers approval, the price of after-sale services, the tools for the after-sale service, the local marketing campaigns and the location of the dealership.
An important feature of the data is that, in specifying the dealers' obligations, the contracts do not simply specify the actual performance that dealers should deliver in the future. Instead they allow the manufacturer to choose this performance at some future moment. Thus, for example, contracts do not determine the target sales of the dealership, the level of publicity investment by dealers or the appropriate qualification of the sales personnel, but instead they grant manufacturers the right to determine and adjust these variables in the future. We call these rights to determine ex-post the actual content of the performance to be delivered completion rights.
The allocation of these completion rights introduces a very important element of flexibility in the contract, allowing a low cost adaptation of the terms of the contracts to new, unexpected, circumstances. It introduces however an important element of asymmetry in the contract. In a sense, except for the implicit reputational guarantee provided by the brand name of the dealer, a dealer is signing a blank check, committing himself to deliver
an as yet unspecified performance.
As Table 1 shows, contract variation in these completion rights is small. Of the 16 types of dealer variables that the contracts potentially assign to manufacturers, only 4 show some variation: those affecting the level of training of the sales force, the number of trial vehicles, the right to limit dealer sales outside of his own territory and the establishment of a minimum capital by the manufacturer.
[Note: Table 1 here]
A particularly salient right assigned by these contracts is the right to establish dealers' annual sales targets. Targets are defined in terms of the market share that the dealer must achieve in the relevant local market and then communicated to dealers in the form of the sales volume they must achieve. They are set every year on January, relying on forecasts elaborated by manufacturers based on historical sales data in the dealer's market and at the national level. The numerical target may be later revised if either the aggregate sales of automobiles or the national market share of the brand are lower than forecasted, providing some partial insurance for the dealers.
Enforcement rights allow manufacturers to play a quasi-judiciary role in ensuring that dealers behave in the best interests of the network. Enforcement rights include manufacturers' rights to monitor dealers, to terminate the relation and to establish monetary discount mechanisms to ensure that sales and service targets are met. We discuss each of these in turn.
First, all contracts assign certain monitoring rights to manufacturers. In particular, as Concerning termination rights, all contracts explicitly assign manufacturers the right to terminate the contracts when the dealer infringes certain duties. In particular, the repeated breach of sales and service targets, the change in the ownership of the dealership or the bankruptcy of the dealership are always reasons for automatic termination. Other circumstances, such as management changes or disagreements among partners or managers also trigger termination rights in some networks. The inclusion of termination at will clauses in contracts would make superfluous the enumeration of individual reasons for termination. However, both the European legislation and the general rules of the Spanish contract law substantially limit the scope for termination at will. The EU legislation requires a two year notice (art. 5.2.2. of Regulation 1474/95), unless the contract is of limited duration (in which case termination only requires a 6 month notice) and forbids discrimination among dealers (art. 5.1.2.b). Moreover, Spanish contractual law restricts further the manufacturer ability to terminate the contract by imposing obligations of good faith (Civil Code, art. 7) and respect to the implicit will of the parties. The most restrictive interpretation of these clauses takes them to imply several duties: a duty of trust (deber de confianza) which obliges the principal to allow the dealer enough time to recover the investment made, a duty of previous notification and a duty of cooperating in the liquidation of the dealership. Other, more expansive interpretations of these rules take it to forbid any 'arbitrary' behavior by the manufacturer (Paz-Ares, 1997:46-8).
Use of Discounts
Sales targets are linked in 20 of the contracts to substantial discounts on the automobile price paid by dealers depending on the degree to which they achieve them. 5 Moreover, in 13 of the networks, dealers obtain discounts that change with customer satisfaction as measured through client polls.
The first row in Table 2 shows the average quantity related discounts applied to the prices of all vehicles acquired by dealers between 1993 and 1995. For example, dealers who met their annual sales targets received a mean discount of 2.38% of the price of all the automobiles they had acquired from the manufacturer in that year. The importance of these discounts is such that most dealers would be unable to obtain any profits if they were not receiving them. Service-related discounts are smaller but also crucial to dealers' profitability. When customer satisfaction is highest, the mean discount on this concept that dealers could obtain annually was 0.73% of the price of all automobiles they acquired from the manufacturers.
Note that, since the discount falls on all the units sold, the discount increases more than proportionally with customer satisfaction.
[NOTE: TABLE 2 here, with sales and service discounts]
Both of these discounts have a "stair-step" pattern. Reaching the next stair (for example, selling the car that gets the dealer to 80% of his sales target) produces a decrease in the price paid by the dealer for all of the previous units sold up to then. As a consequence of this pattern, the marginal price paid by each particular dealer is a decreasing function of the 5 The three networks that did not use sales discounts declared in interviews that they do set and follow up sales targets, however, which they use only to impose disciplinary termination and to justify it before third party enforcers. Thus these three networks rely exclusively on termination to provide incentives to their dealers. 6 Compare the discounts with the average return on sales, which was 0.35% in 1993, 0.66% in 1994, and 1.1% in 1995 (See table A2 in the Appendix A2).
number of cars sold by her. This type of non-linear scheme is unusual in the incentive literature, which has been surprised by the empirical dominance of linear schemes both in general incentive problems (Arrow, 1985; Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1987) and in franchising in particular (Lafontaine, 1992; Bhattacharyya and Lafontaine, 1995) .
ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK: MORAL HAZARD AND ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGN

Rights Assignment, Monetary Incentives and Moral Hazard
The literature has identified two particular reasons why the dealer's choices will be suboptimal from the point of view of an integrated dealer-manufacturer network. First, there exists a vertical externality. As, for example, Klein and Murphy (1988) have argued, as long as the marginal return of a sale to the dealer is only a part of the total return on an extra sale (which is the sum of both mark-ups), the dealer chooses to sell a lower quantity of automobiles and to provide a lower promotional and sales service level than optimal.
Second, the existence of horizontal externalities also leads dealers to produce too little informational and promotional services. Dealers generate information by investing in publicity and providing certain services. Consumers have incentives to obtain information from the dealers who provide it and then acquire their car from other dealers, who may sell at lower prices but do not provide this information. This free-riding by dealers reduces the total supply of publicity and information, which decreases the final demand for cars (Telser, 1960) .
Several alternative mechanisms may be used to solve the problems created by these vertical and horizontal externalities. From our initial description of the problem in Section 2, the following are, a priori, relevant to the case:
• Rights Assignment. The parties can contractually assign to one of them the right to determine and demand as necessary the performance desired from the other party (completion rights), and to establish mechanisms capable of ensuring that this performance is obtained (enforcement rights). The assignment of these completion and enforcement rights involves a trade-off between the risk of ex post opportunism on the two sides. More manufacturer discretion in completion and enforcement reduces the risk of moral hazard on the dealer side, while simultaneously intensifying the risk of manufacturer incentive and hold-up hazards (Klein, Crawford and Alchian, 1978) . This is a particularly important concern in end-game situations, such as when the manufacturer has bad prospects, so that his discount rate is very high, or when technological changes require changes in the structure or operation of the dealerships. In these cases, it may be difficult for third party enforcers to distinguish opportunistic from disciplinary cancellation. 7 As a consequence of this trade-off, the level of discretion available to manufacturers should increase with the risk of dealer moral hazard, as determined by the incidence of vertical and horizontal externalities, and with the safeguard that the manufacturer can provide in the form of reputation.
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• Direct Monetary Incentives. The agency literature has long argued that direct monetary incentive schemes may be used to align the incentives of the two parties in the contract. In our specific context, the implication of the theory is that the intensity of sales and service related monetary incentives should be higher the higher the incidence of the relevant vertical and horizontal externalities.
• Quasi-Rents. As Klein and Leffler (1981) have argued, the threat of termination together with the existence of a flow of quasi-rents may be sufficient to assure contractual performance in the context of repeated transactions. The quasi-rent the dealer receives must be higher the larger the gain from cheating and the lower the probability of cheating being detected.
Complementarities
There exist reasons on theoretical grounds to believe that not only will all elements of the contractual design respond to similar considerations, but that the contract is a system of interdependent choices, so that changes in one choice will necessarily imply changes in the others. As we shall see, formulating tight hypothesis about these complementarities or substitutabilities between the different mechanisms available is fraught with problems. It is, however, an important empirical question if and to what extent these different choices actually interact with each other.
Complementarities between completion rights and the enforcement and incentive
system: An economic analysis of the relation between completion rights and enforcement rights is contained in Milgrom and Roberts (1992: 412) and in Jensen and Meckling (1995) . 9 They argue that incentive intensity (in our context, the whole enforcement and incentive system) is complementary with agent discretion. More decentralized decision rights must lead to higher powered incentives, as agency problems become more important.
In our context we observe manufacturer discretion, the opposite of dealer discretion. Thus we would expect in our context that, the lower the manufacturer discretion in completion, the more intense must be the whole monitoring, termination and incentive systems. Complementarities between termination and monetary incentives. The theory provides little guidance on the relation between termination and explicit monetary incentives, and there is as good reason to believe they are substitutes as to believe they are complements.
As a first approximation, we would expect that the different incentive and enforcement mechanisms would be substitutes: if appropriate incentives are provided through the threat of expropriation of quasi-rents implicit in termination (Klein and Leffler, 1981; Klein and Murphy 1988, 1997) , then explicit monetary discounts are less important.
An alternative hypothesis is obtained from the multitasking set up of Holmstrom and Milgrom (1994) . They argue that, in a multitasking setting 11 , the level of incentives provided by different types of mechanisms is complementary. The two hypotheses thus have opposite implication for the complementarity or substitutability between discounts and termination, and the question must be settled empirically. 10 The monitoring intensity principle is derived in a world of complete contracting, but we have no reason to believe that the sign of the prediction should be affected by whether contracts are or not complete. 11 Again, the analysis originally concerns individual workers, but making the step that allows us to deal with independent firms is straightforward.
Complementarities within monetary incentives. The multitasking hypothesis is the only relevant one to predict the interdependencies between the intensity of the sales and service related monetary incentives. In this case, if more sales related discounts are provided, the dealer may decrease the service effort, and service related discounts must increase to compensate this reaction.
To sum up, there are reasons on theoretical grounds to expect that (1) manufacturer completion rights and enforcement power/incentive intensity be substitutes; (2) that monitoring rights and at least one of either monetary incentive intensity or termination rights be complements; and (3) that service and sales related incentives be complements.
However, the signs of interdependencies is unclear even in this cases, as it is probably fair to say that the theory on this area is in the process of being developed.
Furthermore, stating that two sets of instruments should be substitutes or complements is far from stating that they should co-move empirically, as Holmostrom and Milgrom (1994) have convincingly argued. Whether they do or not depends on the source of variation in the data. In our context, suppose that the source of variation is the different incidence of vertical and horizontal externalities for different networks. Suppose that for example dealer discretion is indeed complementary with stronger incentives. Will we observe comovements between incentives and dealer discretion? There are two effects: as vertical and horizontal externalities increase, dealer discretion must become more limited. If the interdependencies proposed by the theory exist, this would lead to lower incentive intensity.
However, more risk for opportunism mean incentives need to be strengthened. Thus even when in fact dealer discretion and incentives are complements, we may or may not observe comovements between them.
Thus empirically testing the hypothesis formulated above is fraught with problems.
First, because the theory often provides ambiguous guidance about what we should find.
Second, because the empirical existence of complementarities depends on the source of variation in the data, and there are reasons to believe that the vector of choices will not be associated with respect to the changes in the impact of moral hazard that we are exploring.
And finally, because the existence of unaccounted variables observed by the contract designers but not by the econometrician may cause co-movements in the contractual choices when no complementarities exist.
In spite of these difficulties, we analyze the evidence of comovements in the last part of the empirical section. The spirit of this investigation is to further our understanding of the data and to guide further theory development, rather than to actually test any specific hypotheses.
RESULTS: EXPLAINING THE JOINT ASSIGNMENT OF COMPLETION AND ENFORCEMENT RIGHTS AND THE USE OF MONETARY INCENTIVES
In this section we aim to explain the variation observed in the use of decision rights and monetary incentives. In particular, we test the predictions of the theory for the allocation of rights, the use of incentives, and the existence of quasi-rents. We then go on to study the interactions between these choices.
Cross-sectional variation in Manufacturer Enforcement and Completion Rights: Agency Considerations
The theory predicts that the level of discretion available to manufacturers should increase with the risk of dealer moral hazard, as determined by the incidence of vertical and horizontal externalities, and with the safeguard that the manufacturer can provide in the form of reputation. We investigate here this hypothesis.
Dependent Variables. We measure centralization of completion rights in brand i by the number of such rights assigned by the contract of that brand to the manufacturer. We measure the discretion of the manufacturer i in enforcement by the number of monitoring and termination rights assigned to the manufacturer. Moreover, we also study the variation in the assignment of each one of the individual rights in which some between brand variation exists.
Independent Variables.
To analyze the impact of the risk of dealer opportunism on the set of rights assigned to the manufacturer we rely on two variables: the number of dealers in each network and the quality of the cars sold as proxied by the average car price. First, the cost of dealer opportunism grows with the quality of the car purchased. The reason is that the unobservable sales and after-sales service is more important the higher the quality of the car. Second, as in any public good context, the larger the number of dealers in the network the more important the horizontal externality.
These two variables may also covary with the manufacturer reputation. As a number of previous studies have noted (Lafontaine, 1992; Agrawal and Lal, 1995) , brand name value increases with the total number of outlets in each network, since brand name value increases as more people are exposed to the brand. Moreover, the 'externalities' generated by an expropriatory conduct by the manufacturer also grow with the number of dealers exposed to it. The average quality of the automobiles sold as proxied by its price could also be correlated with the manufacturer reputational capital. Clearly, manufacturers who sell more expensive cars incur higher costs with their customers if the relationship with their dealers deteriorates.
Thus, due to both the higher risk of dealer moral hazard and the lower risk of manufacturer expropriation, we expect to find more decision rights to be allocated to the manufacturer the larger the network and the higher the average price of the automobiles sold. This is because both variables have the effect of increasing the risk of dealer moral hazard (increasing the benefits of manufacturer discretion) and decreasing the probability of expropriation (decreasing the costs of manufacturer discretion).
A third variable whose effect we explore is the length of time that the dealership network has been established in the country. This variable has no role in the risk of dealer moral hazard. It does however have implications for the reputational capital of the manufacturer: a longer lasting relationship allows for more reputational capital to be created, as it increases the potential for a cooperative outcome to come about. 12 Other interpretations of this variable are possible, however. A transaction cost explanation for the contract design would make the same prediction, since learning about writing clauses presumably decreases their cost.
Finally, we also include in the analysis controls for the continent of origin of the manufacturer. Here the main concern is to take into account the fact that Asian firms are usually found to be less reliant on formal contractual mechanisms (Sako and Helper, 1998; Holmstrom and Roberts, 1998). As a consequence, we would expect Asian dealers to assign explicitly a smaller number of rights to the manufacturer.
Estimation.
From the theory presented in section 3, the discretion of the manufacturer is a function of the agency costs and the reputation of the manufacturer. We run the following OLS regressions for the clauses of the different types:
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Number of Rights of type j of Manufacturer of Brand i = β 0 + β 1 Average Price of Car of Brand i + β 2 Number of Dealers in Network of Brand i + β 3 Log Number of Years Brand i Network is in Operation + Continent Dummies.
Results. We present the empirical analysis of the manufacturer discretion in Table 3 .
For each discretion variable we present two specifications. The baseline specification 12 We are implicitly assuming that the time a relationship has lasted is a predictor of the time it will still last. 13 See the data appendix for the descriptive statistics of the independent variables. includes the three main proxies. The second row for each variable includes controls for the region of origin of the manufacturer.
[Note: Table 3 here]
The effects of the price, dealer, age and Asia variables are consistent with the predictions of the incentive theory enunciated above. They are also consistent across specifications and across regressions, and, despite the relatively small number of observations, they are significant in most of the regressions on the number of clauses. The exception to this is the age coefficient, which becomes insignificant in all regressions when the Asia control is added. Also quite remarkably, the significance of the main explanatory variables does not decrease substantially as continent controls are added. On their own, the average price sold, the number of dealers in the network and the age of the network explain around 70% of the variation in the allocation of completion rights by these contracts.
The regressors are also economically significant. An increase in price of automobiles of one standard deviation (Pta-1.93 m.) increases manufacturer discretion on average in 2 dimensions. Similarly, an increase of one standard deviation of the number of dealers (65 dealers) also adds on average 2 rights to the manufacturer discretion. Finally, an increase in the Log Age in one standard deviation (.88) increases manufacturer discretion by 1 clause.
[Note: Table 4 here]
Our confidence in these results is increased by the analysis of the individual clause variation presented in Table 4 . 14 The signs of the individual effects are overwhelmingly the ones that Table 3 has led us to expect: of 60 possible signs (15 regressions times 4 independent variables), only 8 are different than in table 3, and all of those 8 are insignificantly different than 0.
The Use of Discounts
The theory in Section 3 predicts that stronger monetary incentives should be used when the cost of dealer opportunism is higher. Also, higher manufacturer reputation should lead to stronger incentive intensity, as the ability of the manufacturer to opportunistically reduce the dealer's income is larger when discounts are a more important component of dealers income, given the ability of the manufacturer to manipulate sales targets.
15 Dependent Variables. The discount level is in itself an imperfect measure of incentive intensity. Provided that sales fall between the minimum and maximum quantity of cars sold necessary to obtain a discount, a dealer faces identical incentives and obtains the same income with higher prices paid and lower average discounts as with lower prices and higher average discounts. For this reason, the discount range is likely to be the right measure of incentive intensity for a wide range of outcomes.
To avoid this conflict, we construct and use several alternative measures of incentive intensity: the use of sales and/or service discounts, the level of each of these discounts, and the range of discounts attainable. For both the level and range, we differentiate between sales and service discounts.
Estimation.
We use an ordered logit to estimate the relation between the use of discounts (0, 1 if either sales or services used and 2 if both) and our independent variables.
We use a Tobit to analyze the variation on the discount rages, as at their lowest the contracts that provide lower monetary incentive intensity have 0 discounts.
[Note: Table 5 here]
Results. The most remarkable fact about Table 5 The lack of predictive power of the sale discount specifications (the second and three sets of regressions in Table 5 ) is puzzling, particularly compared to the high significance levels found in the rest of our analyses. The pseudo-R 2 for these estimations is extremely low, suggesting that the agency-related variables that explain the use of discounts fail to account for the variability of the level and range of sales discount. Alternatively , there may exist some hidden heterogeneity in the strictness of the sales targets across brands. If some manufacturers set very high targets, so that most of their dealers barely achieve the lower step of the discount schedule, while other manufacturers set low targets, so that most dealers achieve over target sales, then the meaning of our range and level of sale discounts is different for different brands. Figuring out whether this is the case would require knowing the ex-post distribution of discounts for different manufacturers. Regrettably, this data is not available.
Quasi-Rents
To test Klein and Leffler's (1981) hypothesis that the flow of quasi-rents to the dealers combined with termination provides a self-enforcing device, Table 6 presents a panel regression of the profitability during three years of the automobile dealerships. We use year dummies, as the observations are at substantially different points in the cycle. Profitability is (imperfectly) proxied here by the return on sales, the standard profitability measure in the industry.
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[ Table 6 Here]
In the presence of more important agency problems the quasi-rents flow must be larger to dissuade dealers from opportunistic behavior. The table provides clear support for this hypothesis in one instance: higher price dealerships have higher profitability, as measured by their return on sales. The coefficient is also economically interesting, as a standard deviation change in the price (Pta. 2 m) leads to a 6 point increase in ROS.
The other coefficients in which our study is interested are insignificantly different from 0, although their signs are as we would expect from the theory. First, profitability increases with horizontal externalities, as measured by the size of the dealership network. Second, it decreases with the age of the network. This is as expected from the theory, for reasons pertaining both to the manufacturer and to the dealer reputational capital. A longer horizon decreases the gains for cheating to both parties, and thus reduces the rent that the dealer needs to receive in order to continue performing, and the implicit compensation he must receive against the risk of manufacturer expropriation.
The results of this regression also provide some additional evidence on an alternative explanation of the data to the one we have suggested here: the possibility that the variation in contractual asymmetry responds to the differential bargaining power of the different automobile manufacturers. The coefficients that predict the existence of quasi-rents are the same ones that predict the existence of asymmetry, and seem to suggest that those networks that have a more asymmetric position actually enjoy higher profitability. This is not as would be predicted by a bargaining explanation of the contractual design. 
Complementarities
As section 3 has argued, we expect on theoretical grounds that the assignment of individual rights depends on the assignment of other rights and on the monetary discount schedule. 17 Sadly as Williamson (1985:238) has pointed out, entirely rejecting this type of explanation is usually not possible, as a bargaining hypothesis consistent with this (and the opposite) data can be constructed. 18 See Athey and Stern (1998) for an excellent discussion of the issues at stake. The computationally intensive method they propose to go around this problem is, however, not applicable to our case given the size of our data set.
In what follows we choose to use the first approach. The reason is that we do not have sufficient information to confidently estimate a production function for the dealership networks, nor do we have a sufficiently narrow definition of output. The downside of the conditional correlation measures is that, if there are variables which are unobserved to us but observed to the firm which favor the use of some practices, we will have upward biased estimates of the conditional correlation. It will appear that different practices are complementary when, in fact, they are simply moving together as a result of the impact of a third variable unknown to us. To analyze the table, focus first on the upper left corner (the first 3 rows), presenting the covariation in the assignment of completion and enforcement rights. Controlling for common sources of variation reduces substantially the covariation from the one that could be observed in table 7. However, the table provides evidence for the existence of comovements between completion and termination rights, with the correlation coefficient between the two remaining statistically significant. The conditional correlation between these two and monitoring rights is also positive, but the number is small and statistically not different from zero. The evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that more manufacturer discretion in termination, a dimension of enforcement, is present when the manufacturer also has more scope for decision making.
With the caveats on interpretation of this conditional correlation mentioned at the end of section 3.2., this result seems to contradict the first hypothesis on complementarities, which predicted that stronger enforcement or incentive intensity should go together with dealer discretion. An alternative hypothesis consistent with what we observe would be based on recognizing the possibility that completion clauses are used partly as a tool against judiciary opportunism on the dealer side (Masten and Snyder, 1993) . If dealers are likely to contest termination decisions, increasing termination rights may require extending the self enforcing range of the relationship (Klein 1992 (Klein , 1996 , in order to protect the manufacturer against distributionally minded judiciary intervention.
The next four rows of the table present the evidence on the use of sales and service discounts. The only coefficients that are significantly different from zero relate the level and the range of discounts, which is of limited economic interest and suggests simply that both are measures of incentive intensity. There is no evidence, however, for the existence of comovements between sales and service discounts.
Controlling for the common effects has eliminated most of the evidence of comovements between rights assignment and discount schedules. The single exception concerns the relation between range of sales discount and monitoring discretion. This is in fact consistent with what the theory would lead us to predict, if the source of variation in the data is indeed the differential impact of moral hazard for different networks. As moral hazard increases, incentive provision needs to be stronger, and this implies that monitoring intensity must increase. Note that two of the three monitoring rights that present some variation in the data are rights to inspect variables that are relevant to the provision of sales related discounts: the right to inspect dealer accounting data and the right to audit the dealer accounting. 19 Finally, the last row shows that there is no evidence that quasi-rents comove with the other instruments.
We find the results illuminating. First, there is evidence consistent with the idea that the whole system, with the possible exception of the quasi-rents, is designed to solve a similar set of problems. Second, there is little evidence for the actual existence of complementarities between the different instruments, with the exception of the relation between monitoring and discounts and between termination and completion rights. Finally, the evidence on the comovements of rights assignment, even after controlling for common sources of variation, is consistent with the hypothesis that the source of variation in the data is the differential impact of moral hazard for the different brands.
CONCLUSION
This paper has studied empirically the entire system of allocation of rights and monetary incentives in franchising contracts. The most salient characteristic of the system is its asymmetry. The system of allocation of rights does not actually specify the terms of the performance that the parties commit to delivering. Instead, the contracts substantially restrict the decision rights of dealers, and grant manufacturers extensive implementation and enforcement powers, converting the manufacturers in a sort of quasi-judiciary instance.
We find that this asymmetric assignment of rights and incentives is consistent with efficiency considerations. When the cost of dealer moral hazard is higher and the risk of manufacturer opportunism is lower as a consequence of his reputation, manufacturers enjoy larger discretion in both determining the desired performance from the dealers in their 19 The evidence on this relation is, however, weakened by the fact that the sale discount equations present the lowest (pseudo)R 2 in our whole analysis. It is easy to argue that, if we had been able to explain more fully the variation in the range of sale discounts the coefficient would have been eliminated. network and in using mechanisms such as monitoring, termination and monetary incentives to ensure this performance is provided. Moreover, it appears that the profitability of dealers in more asymmetric positions vis-à-vis their manufacturers is not smaller, in a manner that appears inconsistent with possible bargaining power explanations.
The paper has also explored the existence of interdependencies between the different elements of the system. On a first approximation, the use of all instruments seems to respond to the same considerations, as the same variables enter with the same signs in most specifications of entirely different instruments. The evidence however, does not support the conclusion that all of these instruments appear together because complementarities between them exist. After controlling for common sources of variation, most of the covariation between instruments becomes insignificant.
As we have pointed out, an important aspect of the logic of the contractual and organizational design structure we observe does not conform to the idea of a contract as a set of vertical restrains usual in the literature (e.g. Mathewson and Winter, 1985) . Instead, the contract design assigns a set of rights to manufacturers that allow them to behave as an internal judge in what is, after all, a relationship between two independently-owned business. 20 What, in our view, the existing theory fails to consider is the ability of the parties to choose between the use of internal or external mechanisms of contract completion and enforcement. The main actors in the economic transactions, the manufacturer and the dealer in this case, have a remarkable informative advantage with respect to third parties, judges included. When the party with the better information reaches a position of impartiality (because of her reputation or because she is going to contract repeatedly), the contractors may decide that that party should act as a judge of first instance. As such, her task is to define ex-post those obligations that are hard to define ex-ante, fitting the content of the contract to the changes that have taken place; distributing unexpected losses and gains; evaluating if each one has fulfilled or not its obligations; and, even, imposing sanctions for breach of contract. 
Notes: * Significant at 5% level; ** Significant at 1% level. 
